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Abstract
Dynamic pricing of commodities without knowing the exact relation between price and
demand is a much-studied problem. Practically all existing studies assume that the parame-
ters describing the market are constant during the selling period. This severely reduces their
practical applicability, since, in reality, market characteristics may change all the time, with-
out the firm always being aware of it. In the present paper we study dynamic pricing and
learning in a changing market environment. We introduce a methodology that enables the
price manager to hedge against changes in the market, and provide explicit upper bounds
on the regret - a measure of the performance of the firm’s pricing decisions. In addition,
this methodology guides the selection of the optimal way to estimate the market process. We
provide numerical examples from practically relevant situations to illustrate the methodology.
Keywords: dynamic pricing, learning, varying parameters
1 Introduction, Contributions, Literature
1.1 Introduction
Firms selling products or delivering services face the complex task of determining which selling
price to charge to their customers. Generally, firms aim at choosing selling prices that maximize
certain performance indicators, such as revenue, profit, or utilization rate. An intrinsic property
of this decision problem is lack of information: the seller does not know how consumers respond
to different selling prices, and thus does not know the optimal price. The problem of the firm
is not merely about optimization, but also about learning the relation between price and market
response.
The presence of digitally available and frequently updated sales data makes this problem essentially
an on-line learning problem: after each sales occurrence, the firm can use the newly obtained sales
∗Part of this research was done while the author was affiliated with Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI),
Amsterdam, Eindhoven University of Technology, and University of Amsterdam.
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data to update its knowledge (for example, via statistical estimation methods). If, in addition,
selling prices can quickly be modified, without much costs or effort - as often is the case in web-
based sales channels or in brick-and-mortar stores with digital price tags - the firm can immediately
exploit its improved knowledge on consumer behavior by appropriately adapting the selling prices.
Optimal pricing policies for these type of problems have been researched extensively. Here we only
list a sample of the recent OR/MS literature; for a more elaborate discussion, including relevant
studies from the economics literature, we refer to den Boer and Zwart (2010).
Lobo and Boyd (2003), Carvalho and Puterman (2005a,b), Bertsimas and Perakis (2006), Besbes
and Zeevi (2009), Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012), den Boer and Zwart (2010) and Harrison
et al. (2011) are all studies that assume that the price-demand relation belongs to a parametric
family, estimate the unknown parameters by classical estimation methods (such as linear regression
or maximum likelihood estimation), and study optimal pricing policies. Similar approaches with
Bayesian estimation methods, can be found in Lin (2006), Araman and Caldentey (2009), Farias
and van Roy (2010) and Harrison et al. (2012). Robust or nonparametric approaches are taken by
Kleinberg and Leighton (2003), Cope (2007), Lim and Shanthikumar (2007), Eren and Maglaras
(2010) and Besbes and Zeevi (2009).
A main conclusion from this stream of literature is that, in general, firms should properly balance
learning and instant optimization. That means that not always the price should be chosen that is
optimal according to current parameter estimates, but some price variation should be induced to
guarantee sufficient quality of future parameter estimates.
All these studies have the assumption in common that the relation between price and expected
sales is stable during the time horizon under consideration: the unknown parameters that de-
scribe this relation do not change. This is a rather strong assumption, which makes these studies
less applicable in practical situations. Markets are generally not stable, but may vary over time,
without the seller immediately being aware of it (cf. Dolan and Jeuland (1981), Wildt and Winer
(1983), and Section 2 of Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003)). These changes may have various
causes: shifts in consumer tastes, competition (Wildt and Winer, 1983), appearance of technolog-
ical innovations (Chen and Jain, 1992), market saturation and product diffusion effects related to
the life cycle of a product (Bass, 1969, Dolan and Jeuland, 1981, Raman and Chatterjee, 1995),
marketing and advertisement efforts (Horsky and Simon 1983), competitors entering or exiting
the market, appearance of new sales channels, and many more.
Wildt and Winer (1983, page 365) argued already in 1983 that “constant-parameter models are
not capable of adequately reflecting such changing market environments”. In fact, this issue has
been known since longtime in the historical literature on statistical economics, as illustrated by
the following quotation of Schultz (1925) on the law of demand:
“The validity of the theoretical law [of demand] is limited to a point in time. But
in order to derive concrete, statistical laws our observations must be numerous; and
in order to obtain the requisite number of observations, data covering a considerable
period must be used. During the interval, however, important dynamic changes take
place in the condition of the market. In the case of a commodity like sugar, the principal
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dynamic changes that need be considered are the changes in our sugar-consuming
habits, fluctuations in the purchasing power of money, and the increase of population.”
(Schultz, 1925, page 409).
Although the literature on dynamic pricing and learning has increased rapidly in recent years,
models with a varying market have hardly been considered. This motivates the current study of
dynamic pricing and learning in a changing environment.
1.2 Contributions
In the present paper we study the problem of dynamic pricing and learning in a changing envi-
ronment. We study the situation where a monopolist firm is selling a single type of product with
unlimited inventory. We consider an additive demand model, where the expected demand for the
product in a certain time period is the sum of a stochastic market process and a known function
depending on the selling price. The characteristics of this stochastic process are unknown to the
firm. Its value at a certain point in time may be estimated from accumulated sales data; however,
since the market may be changing over time, estimation methods are needed that are designed for
time-varying systems. We deploy two such estimators, namely estimation with a forgetting factor,
and estimation based on a “sliding window” approach. For both estimators we derive an upper
bound on the expected estimation error.
Next, we propose a simple, intuitive pricing policy: at each decision moment, the firm estimates
the market process with one of the just mentioned estimators, and subsequently sets the next
selling price equal to the price that would be optimal if the firm’s market estimate were correct.
This is a so-called myopic or certainty equivalent policy: at each decision moment the firm acts
as if being certain about its estimates. To measure the quality of this pricing policy, we define
AverageRegret(T ), which measures the expected costs of not choosing optimal prices in the first
T periods, and LongRunAverageRegret, which equals the limit superior of AverageRegret(T ) as T
grows large. We derive upper bounds on AverageRegret(T ) and LongRunAverageRegret. These
bounds are not only stated in terms of the variables associated with the used estimation method
(the forgetting factor, or the size of the sliding window), but also in terms of a measure of the
impact that market fluctuations have on the estimation error. Clearly, if the market is very
unstable and inhibits very large and frequent fluctuations, the impact may become extremely
large, which negatively affects the obtained revenue.
The novel, key idea of this study is that (i) this impact can be bounded, using assumptions on the
market process that the firm makes a priori, (ii) the resulting upper bounds on AverageRegret(T )
and LongRunAverageRegret can be used by the firm to determine the optimal estimator of the
market (i.e. the optimal value of the forgetting factor or window size), (iii) this provides the firm
explicit guarantees on the maximum expected revenue loss. This framework enables the firm
to hedge against change: the firm is certain that the expected regret does not exceed a certain
known value, provided the market process satisfies the posed assumptions. These assumptions
may be very general and cover many important cases; for example, bounds on the probability that
the market value changes in a certain period, bounds on the maximum difference between two
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consecutive market values, or bounds on the maximum and minimum value that the market process
may attain. We provide numerical examples to illustrate the methodology, in two practically
relevant settings: in the first we make use of the well-known Bass model to model the diffusion
of an innovative products; and in the second we consider an oligopoly where price changes by
competitors causes occasional changes in the market. The application of our methodology on the
Bass model makes this the first study that incorporates learning and pricing in this widely used
product-diffusion model; thus far, only deterministic settings (Robinson and Lakhani, 1975, Dolan
and Jeuland, 1981, Kalish, 1983), or random settings where no learning is present (Chen and Jain,
1992, Raman and Chatterjee, 1995, Kamrad et al., 2005) have been considered in the literature.
Summarizing, in one of the first studies on dynamic pricing and learning in a changing environment,
our contributions are as follows.
(i) We introduce a model of dynamic pricing and learning in a changing market environment,
using a very generic description of the market process.
(ii) We discuss two estimators of time-varying processes, and prove upper bounds on the esti-
mation error.
(iii) We propose a methodology that enables the decision maker to hedge against change. This
results in explicit upper bounds on the regret, and guides the choice of the optimal estimator.
(iv) We show the application of the methodology in several concrete cases, and offer numerical
examples to illustrate its use and performance. These examples show that incorporating the
changing nature of the market process can significantly improve a firm’s revenue.
1.3 Comparison to Relevant Literature
The combination of dynamic pricing and learning in a changing market is a rather unexplored area.
Besbes and Zeevi (2011) study a pricing problem where the willingness-to-pay (WtP) distribution
of the customers changes at some unknown point in time. The WtP distribution before and after
the change are assumed to be known, only the time of change is unknown to the seller. Lower
bounds on the worst-case regret are derived, and pricing strategies are developed that achieve the
order of these bounds. Chen and Jain (1992) consider optimal pricing policies in models where
the demand not only depends on the selling price, but also on the cumulative amount of sales;
in this way diffusion effects are modeled. In addition, the demand is influenced by an observable
state variable, which models unpredictable events that change the demand function, and whose
dynamics are driven by a Poisson process. Apart from these random events, the demand is fully
deterministic and known to the firm, and learning by the firm is not considered. Hanssens et al.
(2001) and Leeflang et al. (2009, Section 2.3) discuss several dynamic market models, as well
as estimation methods, but do not integrate this with the problem of optimal dynamic pricing.
A recent study that is closely related to our work is Besbes and Saure (2012). They consider
dynamic pricing with finite selling season and finite inventory that cannot be replenished. The
demand function is unknown and subject to abrupt changes. The authors focus on the trade-off
between gaining revenue before and after the change-point, and derive in various settings structural
4
properties of the optimal price policy. A relevant study from the control literature is from Godoy
et al. (2009). They consider an estimation problem in a linear system, where the parameters
are subject to shock changes, and analyze the performance of a sliding-window linear regression
method. A major assumption is that the controls are deterministic. This differs from pricing
problems, where the prices (the controls) usually depend in a non-trivial way on all previously
observed sales realizations. We also refer to recent work by Garivier and Moulines (2011) on
multi-armed bandit problems with time-varying parameters. Two differences between their and
our work are (i) they consider a discrete action set, whereas, in our setting, prices can be chosen
from a continuum, and (ii) they restrict themselves to abruptly changing environments, whereas
our analysis is more generic, including slowly changing environments.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, discusses estimation
methods for the market process, gives bounds on the estimation error, and provides a discussion
on various model assumptions. Section 3 introduces the methodology for hedging against change:
we formulate the pricing myopic policy and provide performance bounds in Section 3.1, we show
in Section 3.2 how assumptions on the market process can be used to find the optimal estimator
that minimizes these regret bounds, and provide in Section 3.3 three examples of the methodology.
The results of two numerical studies are described in 4, and conclusions and directions for future
research are discussed in Section 5. All mathematical proofs are contained in Section 6.
2 Model Primitives
2.1 Model Description
We consider a monopolist firm selling a single type of product. In each time period t ∈ N, the
firm decides on a selling price pt ∈ [pl, ph], where 0 ≤ pl < ph <∞ denote the lowest and highest
admissible price. After choosing the price, the seller observes demand dt, which is a realization
of the random variable Dt(pt). Conditional on the selling prices, the demand in different time
periods is independent. The expected demand in period t, against a price p, is of the form
E [Dt(p)] =M(t) + gt(p). (1)
Here (M(t))t∈N is a stochastic process called the market process, unobservable for the firm, and
taking values in a (possibly infinite) interval M ⊂ R. Let Ft be the σ-algebra generated by
d1, p1,M(1), . . . , dt, pt,M(t), F0 the trivial σ-algebra, and write ǫt = dt − gt(pt)−M(t); then we
assume that M(t) and ǫt are Ft−1-measurable, for all t ∈ N. In addition we impose the following
mild conditions on the moments of M(t) and ǫt: there are positive constants σM and σ, such that
sup
t∈N
E
[
M(t)2 | Ft−1
] ≤ σ2M a.s. and sup
t∈N
E
[
ǫ2t | Ft−1
] ≤ σ2 a.s. (2)
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The functions gt in (1) model the dependence of expected demand on selling price. They are
assumed to be known by the seller. After observing demand, the seller collects revenue ptdt, and
proceeds to the next period. The purpose of the seller is to maximize expected revenue.
Let rt(p,M) = p·(M+gt(p)) denote the expected revenue in period t ∈ N, when the market process
equalsM and the selling price is set at p. The price that generates the highest amount of expected
revenue, given that the current market equals M , is denoted by p∗t (M) = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
rt(p,M).
We impose some mild conditions to ensure that this optimal price exists and is uniquely defined.
In particular, we assume that for all admissible prices p and all t ∈ N, gt(p) is decreasing in p, and
twice continuously differentiable w.r.t. p, with first and second derivative denoted by g′t(p) and
g′′t (p). These two properties immediately carry over to the expected demand, and in fact are quite
natural conditions for demand functions to hold. In addition, we assume that for all M ∈M and
all t ∈ N the revenue function rt(p,M) is unimodal with unique optimum p#t (M) ∈ R satisfying
r′t(p
#
t (M),M) = 0, and in addition
sup
{
r′′t (p
#
t (M),M) | t ∈ N,M ∈M, p#t (M) ∈ [pl, ph]
}
< 0, (3)
where r′t(p,M) and r
′′
t (p,M) denote the first and second derivative of rt(p,M) w.r.t. p.
The value of the market process and the corresponding optimal price are unknown to the seller.
As a result, the decision maker might choose sub-optimal prices, which incurs a loss of revenue
relative to someone who would know the market process and the optimal price. The goal of the
seller is to determine a pricing policy that minimizes this loss of revenue. With a pricing policy
we here mean a sequence of (possibly random) prices (pt)t∈N in [pl, ph], where each price pt may
depend on all previously chosen prices p1, . . . , pt−1 and demand realizations d1, . . . , dt−1.
To assess the quality of a pricing policy Φ, we define the following two quantities.
AverageRegret(Φ, T ) =
1
T − 1
T∑
t=2
E [rt(p
∗
t (M(t)),M(t))− rt(pt,M(t))] , (4)
LongRunAverageRegret(Φ) = lim sup
T→∞
AverageRegret(Φ, T ). (5)
Each term in the summand of (4) measures the expected revenue loss caused by not using the
optimal price in period t. The expectation operator is because both pt and M(t) may be random
variables. We start measuring the average regret from the second period. This simplifies several
expressions that appear in further sections; in addition, in the first period, no data is available
to estimate M(1), and minimizing the instantaneous regret encountered in the first period is not
possible. Furthermore, note that AverageRegret(Φ, T ) and LongRunAverageRegret(Φ) are not
observed by the seller, and thus can not directly be used to determine an optimal pricing policy.
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2.2 Estimation of Market Process
Estimating the value of the market process gives vital information that is needed to determine
the selling price. Since the market may change over time, the firm needs an estimation method
that can handle such changes. In this section we describe two such methods: (I) estimation with
forgetting factor, and (II) estimation with a sliding window.
(I) Estimation of M(t) with forgetting factor. Let λ ∈ [0, 1] be the forgetting factor, to be
determined by the decision maker. The estimate Mˆλ(t), with forgetting factor λ, based on demand
realizations d1, . . . , dt and prices p1, . . . , pt, is equal to
Mˆλ(t) = arg min
M∈R
t∑
i=1
(di −M − gi(pi))2λt−i. (6)
The factor λt−i acts as a weight on the data (pi, di)1≤i≤t. Data that lies further in the past gets
a lower weight; data from the recent past receives more weight (unless λ = 1, in which case all
available data gets equal weight, or λ = 0, in which case only the most recent observation is taken
into account). This captures the idea that the longer ago data has been generated, the likelier it
is that the corresponding value of the market process differs from its current value. Accordingly,
data from longer ago is assigned a smaller weight than data from the more recent past. Whether
this intuition is true depends of course on the specific characteristics of M(t).
By differentiating the righthandside of (6) w.r.t. M , we obtain the following explicit expression
for Mˆλ(t):
Mˆλ(t) =
∑t
i=1(di − gi(pi))λt−i∑t
i=1 λ
t−i
. (7)
(II) Estimation ofM(t) with a sliding window. Let N ∈ N≥2∪{∞} be the window size, determined
by the decision maker. The estimate MˆN (t), with sliding window size N , based on demand
realizations d1, . . . , dt and prices p1, . . . , pt, is equal to
MˆN (t) = arg min
M∈R
t∑
i=max{t−N+1,1}
(di −M − gi(pi))2. (8)
Here only data from the N most recent observations is used to form an estimate. All data that
is generated longer than N time periods ago, is neglected (if N = ∞, then all available data
is taken into account). Similar to the estimate with forgetting factor, the rationale behind the
estimate MˆN (t) is the idea that for data generated long ago, it is more likely that the corresponding
market value differs from its current value. This is captured in the fact that only the N most
recent observations are used to estimate M(t). Whether this idea is correct depends again on the
specifics of M(t).
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Differentiating the righthandside of (8) w.r.t. M , we obtain the following expression:
MˆN (t) =
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=max{t−N+1,1}
(di − gi(pi)). (9)
Remark 1. Both estimation methods (I) and (II) depend on a decision variable (λ resp. N) that
can be interpreted as a measure for the responsiveness to changes in the market. A high value of
λ resp. N means that much information from the historical data is used to form estimates; this
is advantageous in case of a stable market, but disadvantageous in case of many or large recent
changes in the market process. Similarly, a low value of λ resp. N implies that the estimate of
M(t) is mainly determined by recent data; naturally, this is more beneficial in a volatile market
than in a stable market.
2.3 Impact Measure and Quality of Market Estimates
Market fluctuations influence the accuracy of the estimates Mˆλ(t) and MˆN (t). The following
quantities Iλ(t) and IN (t) measure this impact of market variations on the estimates. Observe
that this impact is not solely determined by the market process, but also by the choice of λ and
N :
Iλ(t) = E


∣∣∣∣∣
(
1− λ
1− λt1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
) t∑
i=1
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 ,
IN (t) = E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

 .
The following proposition gives a bound on the expected estimation error of (I) and (II), in terms
of λ, N , and the impact measures Iλ(t) and IN (t).
Proposition 1. For all t ∈ N,
E
[∣∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
≤ 2σ2
[
(1− λ)
(1 + λ)
(1 + λt)
(1− λt)1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
]
+ 2Iλ(t) (10)
and
E
[∣∣∣MˆN (t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
≤ 2 σ
2
min{N, t} + 2IN (t). (11)
If the processes (ǫt)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, then
E
[∣∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
≤ σ2
[
(1− λ)
(1 + λ)
(1 + λt)
(1− λt)1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
]
+ Iλ(t) (12)
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and
E
[∣∣∣MˆN (t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
≤ σ
2
min{N, t} + IN (t), (13)
with equality in (12), (13) if the disturbance terms are homoscedastic, i.e. E[ǫ2t | Ft−1] = σ2 for
all t ∈ N.
Remark 2. The first terms of the righthandsides of (10) - (13) are related to the natural fluc-
tuations in demand. The lower these fluctuations, measured by σ2, the lower this part of the
estimation error becomes. The second terms of the righthandsides of (10) - (13) relate to the
impact that market fluctuations have on the quality of the estimate of M(t). These terms are
nonnegative, and equal zero if the market value does never change.
2.4 Discussion of Model Assumptions
Our demand model is of the additive form E [Dt(p)] = M(t) + gt(p), where M(t) is unknown
and gt(p) is known. The term M(t) can be regarded as capturing various time-varying aspects of
the true demand model, with possibly complex behavior that is not fully known or understood
by the decision maker. If we would only assume that M(t) lies in some known uncertainty M,
then a typical approach would be to optimize the price given the worst-case value of M(t) in
M. A disadvantage of this robust optimization approach is that the accumulating observations
of (M(t))t∈N are not used by the firm to improve its price decisions. Our work distinguishes itself
from the ’static’ robust optimization approach by allowing some way learning or tracking the
market process.
An alternative way of viewing the demand model is to regard gt(p) as the firm’s local approxima-
tion of a more complex demand model, and M(t) as the time-dependent deviation between this
approximation and the true demand. In this way M(t) may capture (unavoidable) model errors
made by the firm.
Note that instead of an additive model one could also assume a multiplicative demand model, where
the expected demand is the product of the two parts: E [Dt(p)] =M(t) · gt(p). An advantage of a
multiplicative model is that, under some additional assumptions, the aggregate demand in a time
period may be explained in terms of the buying behavior of individual customers. For example,
one could assume that individual customers have a willingness-to-pay (WtP) distribution F (p): if
the selling price equals p, a randomly selected customer buys a product with probability 1−F (p).
If there areM(t) customers present, and their buying-decisions are mutually independent, then the
expected aggregated demand E[D(p)] has the multiplicative form M(t) · (1−F (p)). Such demand
model can thus be explained in terms of the behavior of individual customers, but only using the
strong assumptions that the customers behave independently and buy only a single product. In
our setting it would be inappropriate to pose such strong assumptions on consumer behavior: we
study how a seller can handle a volatile, unstable market while making only minor assumptions
on its behavior.
Another motivation for the additive demand model is related to the optimal price. By differenti-
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ating the revenue function w.r.t. p, one can easily show that the optimal price in a multiplicative
demand model is the solution to the equation pg′t(p)/gt(p) = −1. This equation is independent
of the market process, and as a result, the firm does not need to know or estimate the market in
order to determine the optimal selling price. Intuitively it is clear that for many products such a
model does not accurately reflect reality.
An important subclass of our demand model is the setting where gt(p) = g(p), i.e. the expected
demand is the sum of a time-dependent part and a price-dependent time-homogeneous part. Such
demand models appear frequently in the literature: for example, in models that incorporate
competition (Puu, 1991, Tuinstra, 2004, Cooper et al., 2012), or models that capture market
diffusion and saturation effects (Chen and Jain (1992, Section IV), Raman and Chatterjee (1995,
Section 4.3), Kalish (1983, Section 3.3.1)). Some of the numerical examples in Section 4 apply our
pricing policy to these two settings.
The assumptions on gt and rt are fairly standard conditions on demand and revenue functions,
and ensure that the revenue function is locally strictly concave around the optimum. Clearly, if
p#t (M) lies in the interval [pl, ph] then p
∗
t (M) = p
#
t (M), and if p
#
t (M) /∈ [pl, ph], then p∗t (M) is
the projection of p#t (M) on the interval [pl, ph]. It is not difficult to show that the conditions on gt
are satisfied for the linear demand model with gt(p) = −bp for some b > 0. For nonlinear demand
functions with gt(p) = −bpc for some b > 0, c > 0, c 6= 1, or gt(p) = −b log(p) for some b > 0, the
conditions are satisfied if the market process is bounded.
3 Hedging against Changes in the Market
In this section we show how a price manager can hedge against changes in the market. The key
idea is that a simply myopic policy can be used (which means that one always chooses the price
that is optimal according to current estimates of the market process), but that the parameter λ
of the market estimator Mˆλ(t) (or N , for the estimator MˆN (t)) is chosen in a smart way.
As already alluded to in Section 2.2, the optimal value of λ or N depends on the nature of changes
in the market process. If changes are frequent and/or large, λ and N should be chosen small,
whereas in case of infrequent and small changes in the market one intuitively expects that λ
should be chosen close to one, and N large.
Thus, in order to find a good choice of λ resp. N , the firm needs assumptions on the type of
changes in the market that it is anticipating. Such assumptions can be translated into bounds on
the behavior of the influence measures Iλ(t), IN (t), which in turn lead to bounds on the regret
of the myopic policy. These regret bounds depend on λ or N , and minimizing them leads to the
optimal value of λ or N w.r.t. the assumptions on the market imposed by the firm.
The following two subsections elaborate this approach. Section 3.1 formulates the myopic policy
and studies how the regret depends on the influence measures Iλ(t), IN (t). Section 3.2 explains
the methodology in more detail, and Section 3.3 provides three illustrative examples.
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3.1 Performance Bounds for Myopic Policy
We consider the following simple, myopic pricing policy: at each decision moment the seller
estimates the market value with one of the two estimation methods described in Section 2.2, and
subsequently chooses the selling price that is optimal w.r.t. this estimate. In other words, the
seller always acts as if the current estimate of the market is correct.
We denote this policy by Φλ if the market is estimated by method (I), with forgetting factor λ,
and by ΦN if the market is estimated by method (II), with sliding window of size N . The formal
description of Φλ and ΦN is as follows.
Myopic pricing policy Φλ / ΦN
Initialization: Choose λ ∈ [0, 1] or N ∈ N≥2 ∪ {∞}.
Set p1 ∈ [pl, ph] arbitrarily.
For all t ∈ N:
Estimation: Let Mˆ·(t) denote either Mˆλ(t) (for policy Φλ) or MˆN (t) (for policy ΦN ).
Pricing: Set pt+1 = p
∗
t+1(Mˆ·(t)).
The following theorem provides upper bounds on the (long run) average regret for the myopic
pricing policies, in terms of the influence measures Iλ(t) and IN (t).
Theorem 1. There is a K0 > 0 such that for all T ≥ 2,
AverageRegret(Φλ, T ) ≤ 2K0σ2
[
1− λ
1 + λ
+
2
T − 1
(
λ log(λ) + (1− λ) log(1− λ)
(1 + λ) log(λ)
)]
1(λ < 1)
+ 2K0σ
2
[
1 + log(T − 1)
T − 1
]
1(λ = 1)
+ 2K0
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
Iλ(t),
and
AverageRegret(ΦN , T ) ≤ 2K0σ2
[
log(min{T − 1, N})
T − 1 +
1
min{N,T − 1}
]
+
2K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
IN (t).
Consequentially,
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1− λ
1 + λ
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Iλ(t)
]
, (14)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], and
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
IN (t)
]
, (15)
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for all N ∈ N≥2 ∪ {∞}, where we write 1/∞ = 0.
The main idea of the proof is to show that there is a K0 > 0 such that for any M and M
′,
the instantaneous regret in period t satisfies rt(p
∗
t (M),M) − rt(p∗t (M ′),M) ≤ K0(M − M ′)2.
Subsequently we apply the bounds derived in Proposition 1.
Remark 3. By (12) and (13), if the processes (ǫt)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, then all
four inequalities of Theorem 1 are still valid if all righthandsides are divided by 2.
Remark 4. An explicit expression for K0 is derived in the proof of Theorem 1. To obtain the
most sharp bounds, one could also define K0 directly as
K0 = supt∈N infM 6=M ′(rt(p
∗
t (M),M)−rt(p∗t (M ′),M))/(M −M ′)2. For the important special case
of a stationary linear demand function, with gt(p) = g(p) = −bp for some b > 0 and M(t) > 0 for
all t ∈ N, it is not difficult to show p∗t (M) = min{max{M/(2b), pl}, ph} and K0 = 1/(4b).
Remark 5. In dynamic pricing and learning studies that assume a stable market, one often
considers the asymptotic behavior of Regret(Φ, T ) = (T − 1) · AverageRegret(Φ, T ), where Φ
denotes the pricing policy that is used. Typically one proves bounds on the growth rate of
Regret(Φ, T ) for a certain policy, e.g. Regret(Φ, T ) = O(
√
T ) or Regret(Φ, T ) = O(log(T )). A
policy is considered ’good’ if the speed of convergence of the regret is close the best achievable rate,
cf. Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012), Harrison et al. (2011) and den Boer and Zwart (2010). In
the setting with a changing market, a simple example makes clear that one cannot do better than
Regret(Φ, T ) = O(T ) or AverageRegret(Φ, T ) = O(1). Suppose M(t) is a Markov process taking
values in {M1,M2} ∈ R2+, with M1 6= M2, and suppose P (M(t+ 1) = Mi | M(t) = Mj) = 12 , for
all i, j ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ N. Let gt(p) = g(p) = −bp for some b > 0 and all t ∈ N, and choose [pl, ph]
such that p#t (Mi) = Mi/(2b) ∈ (pl, ph), for i = 1, 2. Then for all t ∈ N, the instantaneous regret
incurred in period t satisfies
E [rt(p
∗
t (M(t)),M(t))− rt(pt,M(t))]
≥ inf
p∈[pl,ph]
[1
2
(rt(p
∗
t (M1),M1)− rt(p,M1)) +
1
2
(rt(p
∗
t (M2),M2)− rt(p,M2))
]
≥ b
2
inf
p∈[pl,ph]
[
(p∗(M1)− p)2 + (p∗(M2)− p)2
]
≥ b
4
(p∗t (M1)− p∗t (M2))2
≥ 1
16b
(M1 −M2)2 > 0,
which implies that no policy can achieve a sub-linear Regret(Φ, T ) = o(T ). In fact, any pricing
policy achieves the optimal growth rate Regret(Φ, T ) = O(T ). Thus, the challenge of dynamic
pricing and learning in such a changing environment is not to find a policy with optimal asymptotic
growth rate, but rather to make the (long run) average regret as small as possible.
In view of the remark above, the question raises whether the bounds from Theorem 1 are sharp.
The following proposition answers this question for the case of a linear stationary demand function
with homoscedastic disturbance terms independent of the market process.
Proposition 2. Suppose gt(p) = g(p) = −bp for some b > 0 and all t ∈ N, E[ǫ2t | Ft−1] = σ2 for
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all t ∈ N, the processes (ǫt)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, and M(t) ∈ [2bpl, 2bph] a.s. for all
t ∈ N. Then, with K0 = 1/(4b),
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ) = K0
[
σ2
1− λ
1 + λ
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Iλ(t)
]
, (16)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], and
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN ) = K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
IN (t)
]
, (17)
for all N ∈ N≥2 ∪ {∞}, where we write 1/∞ = 0.
3.2 Methodology for Hedging Against Changes
The bounds on the regret that we derive in Theorem 1 are stated in terms of the influence measures
Iλ(t) and IN (t). That means that the seller can get an explicit upper bound on the regret in terms
of λ, N , if it can find upper bounds on the influence measures in terms of λ, N ; subsequently, an
optimal choice of λ, N can be found by minimizing these upper bounds on the regret.
More precisely, the firm should translate its assumptions on the market process into (non-random)
upper bounds on the terms 1T−1
∑T−1
t=1 Iλ(t) and
1
T−1
∑T−1
t=1 IN (t). By plugging these bounds into
Theorem 1, it obtains bounds on AverageRegret(Φλ, T ) and AverageRegret(ΦN , T ) in terms of λ
and N . The optimal choices of λ and N are then determined by simply minimizing these bounds
with respect to λ and N . In some cases an explicit expression for the optimal choice may exist,
otherwise numerical methods are needed to determine the optimum.
The resulting optimal optimal λ and N may depend on the length of the time horizon T . This may
be undesirable to the firm, for instance because T is not known in advance, or because the time
horizon is infinite. In this case it is more appropriate to minimize the LongRunAverageRegret.
If the firm can translate its assumptions on the market process into upper bounds on the terms
lim supT→∞
1
T−1
∑T−1
t=1 Iλ(t) and lim supT→∞
1
T−1
∑T−1
t=1 IN (t), then these upper bounds can be
plugged into (14) and (15), and the optimal λ andN can be determined by minimizing the resulting
expression.
Remark 6. Observe that the optimal choices of λ and N are independent of the functions gt.
The relevant properties of gt are captured by the constant K0, but its value does not influence
the optimal λ and N . In a way this separates optimal estimation and optimal pricing: the first is
determined by the impact of the market process, while only the latter involves the functions gt. On
the other hand, the variance of the demand distribution, related to σ2, does influence the optimal
λ and N . In addition, note that by Remark 3, the factor 2 on the righthandsides of (14) and (15)
can be removed if the processes (ǫt)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent. In practice, it may not
always be known to the decision maker whether this condition is satisfied; but, fortunately, this
does not influence the optimal choice of λ and N .
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Remark 7. The above presented methodology of hedging against change has some similarities
with robust optimization. There, one usually considers optimization problems whose optimal
solutions depend on some parameters. These parameters are not known exactly by the decision
maker, but assumed to lie in a certain “uncertainty set” which is known in advance. The optimal
decision is then determined by optimizing against the worst case of the possible parameter values.
An improvement of our methodology compared to robust optimization is that we allow for many
different types of assumptions on the market process, as illustrated by the three examples described
in Section 3.3. In contrast, robust optimization generally only assumes a setting of an uncertainty
set. In addition, in robust optimization there is usually no learning of the unknown parameters,
whereas our methodology allows using accumulating data to estimate the unknown process; in
several instances this enables us to “track” the market process.
3.3 Examples
To illustrate the methodology, we look in more detail to three examples of assumptions on the
market process: (i) bounds on the range of the market process, (ii) bounds on the maximum jump
of the market process, and (iii) bounds on the probability that the market changes.
3.3.1 Bounds on the range of the market process.
In this section we consider the assumption that the market process is contained in a bounded
interval.
Proposition 3. If supt∈NM(t)− inft∈NM(t) ≤ d a.s., for some d > 0, then
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1− λ
1 + λ
+ d2
]
, (18)
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ d2
]
, (19)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], N ∈ N≥2 ∪ {∞}, where we write 1/∞ = 0.
The righthandsides of (18) and (19) are minimized by taking λ = 1 and N =∞.
At first sight it may seem somewhat surprising that it is beneficial to take into account all available
sales data to estimate the market, including ’very old’ data. This can be explained by noting that
in a period t + 1, all preceding values of the market M(1), . . . ,M(t) may differ by d from the
current value M(t + 1). In such a volatile market situation, it is best to ’accept’ an unavoidable
error caused by market fluctuations, and instead focus on minimizing the estimation error caused
by natural fluctuations ǫ1, . . . , ǫt in the demand distribution. This is best done when all available
data is taken into account; hence the optimality of choosing λ = 1 and N =∞.
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3.3.2 Bounds on one-step market changes.
In this section we consider the assumption that the one-step changes of the market process are
bounded.
Proposition 4. If supt∈N |M(t)−M(t+ 1)| ≤ d a.s., for some d > 0, then
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1− λ
1 + λ
+ d2
1
(1− λ)2
]
, (20)
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1
N
+
1
4
d2(N + 1)2
]
, (21)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], N ∈ N≥2 ∪ {∞}, where we write 1/∞ = 0.
Consider the upper bound (20). The derivative of σ2 (1−λ)(1+λ) + d
2(1 − λ)−2 w.r.t. λ ∈ (0, 1) is zero
if and only if (σ/d)2(1− λ)3 = (1 + λ)2. Since (1− λ)3 is decreasing and (1 + λ)2 is increasing in
λ, we have the following possibilities:
1. (σ/d)2 ≤ 1. Then σ2 (1−λ)(1+λ) + d2(1 − λ)−2 is increasing on λ ∈ (0, 1), and the righthandside
of (20) is minimized by taking λ = 0.
2. (σ/d)2 > 1. Then there is a unique λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes σ2 (1−λ)(1+λ) + d2(1 − λ)−2. Al-
though an explicit expression exists for λ∗, it is rather complicated, and it is not informative
to state it here. The value of λ∗ can be computed by solving a cubic equation.
Now consider the upper bound (21). The expression σ
2
N +
1
4d
2(N + 1)2 on the righthandside of
(21) is minimized by choosing N as the solution to N2(N +1) = 2(σ/d)2, which follows by taking
the derivative w.r.t. N and some basic algebraic manipulations. It can easily be shown that there
is a unique solution N∗ > 0, at which the minimum is attained, and that σ
2
N + c(N) is minimized
by choosing N equal to either ⌊N∗⌋ or ⌈N∗⌉. If (σ/d)2 ≤ 10/4 then the optimal N equals 1, if
(σ/d)2 > 10/4 then the optimal N is strictly larger than 1. Figure 1 shows the relation between
(σ/d)2 and the values of λ∗, N∗ that minimize the righthandside of (20), (21).
Figure 1: Relation between (σ/d)2 and λ∗, N∗.
The quantity (σ/d)2 serves as a proxy for the volatility of the market process (M(t))t∈N relative to
the variance of the disturbance terms (ǫt)t∈N. Both for Φλ and ΦN one can show that the optimal
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choice of λ and N is monotone increasing in this quantity (σ/d)2. The larger the volatility of
the market compared to the variance of the disturbance terms, the fewer data should be used to
estimate the market. If (σ/d)2 is sufficiently small, then the market fluctuations are quite large
relative to the variance of the disturbance terms, and it is optimal to take only the most recent
data point into account to estimate the market.
3.3.3 Bounded jump probabilities for the market process.
In this section we consider assumptions on the maximum probability that the market value changes.
Proposition 5. If P (M(t+ 1) 6=M(t)) ≤ ǫ for all t ∈ N and some ǫ ≥ 0, and in addition
supt∈NM(t)− inft∈NM(t) ≤ d for some d > 0, then
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1− λ
1 + λ
+ d2ǫ
1
(1− λ2)
]
, (22)
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN ) ≤ 2K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ d2ǫ
(N + 1)(2N + 1)
6N
]
, (23)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1], N ∈ N≥2 ∪ {∞}, where we write 1/∞ = 0.
Consider the upper bound (22). The derivative of σ2 (1−λ)(1+λ) + d
2ǫ(1− λ2)−1 w.r.t. λ ∈ (0, 1) is zero
if and only if σ
2
d2ǫ (1 − λ2)2 = λ(1 + λ)2; this follows from basic algebraic manipulations. Since
(1− λ2)2 is decreasing and λ(1 + λ)2 is increasing in λ, we have the following possibilities:
1. σ
2
d2ǫ ≤ 1. Then σ2 (1−λ)(1+λ) + d2ǫ(1− λ2)−1 is increasing on λ ∈ (0, 1), and the righthandside of
(22) is minimized by λ = 0.
2. σ
2
d2ǫ > 1. Then there is a unique λ
∗ ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes σ2 (1−λ)(1+λ) +d2ǫ(1−λ2)−1. It is the
unique solution in (0, 1) of the quartic equation σ
2
d2ǫ (1 − λ2)2 = λ(1 + λ)2, which can easily
be solved numerically.
Now consider the upper bound (23). The expression σ
2
N + d
2ǫ (N+1)(2N+1)6N is minimized on R++
by choosing N∗ =
√
3σ2
d2ǫ +
1
2 , and the optimal N is equal to either ⌊N∗⌋ or ⌈N∗⌉. In addition,
one can show that the optimal N equals 1 if σ
2
d2ǫ ≤ 12 , and is strictly larger than 1 if σ
2
d2ǫ >
1
2 .
The quantity σ
2
d2ǫ serves as a proxy for the volatility of the market process (M(t))t∈N relative to
the variance of the disturbance terms (ǫt)t∈N. The effect of
σ2
d2ǫ on λ
∗ and N∗ is shown in Figure
2. It shows that the smaller the volatility of the market relative to natural fluctuations of demand
(e.g. the larger σ
2
d2ǫ ), the more data should be taken into account to estimate the market process.
4 Numerical Illustration
In this section, we describe two numerical experiments that illustrate the method of hedging
against changes outlined in Section 3. In the first we consider pricing with the Bass model for the
market process. In the second we consider pricing in a setting with price-changing competitors.
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Figure 2: Relation between σ
2
d2ǫ and λ
∗, N∗
4.1 Pricing with the Bass Model for the Market Process
The Bass model (Bass, 1969) is a widely-used model to describe the life-cycle or diffusion of an
innovative product. An important property of this model is that the market process M(t) is
dependent on the realized cumulative sales up to time t.
Set-up:
The model for M(t) is
M(t) = max
{
0, a+ b
t−1∑
i=1
di + c
( t−1∑
i=1
di
)2}
,
cf. equation (4) of Dodds (1973). We choose a = 33.6, c = −10−6 and b = 0.0116, and set
gt(p) = g(p) = −p for all t ∈ N, pl = 1 and ph = 50. Let (ǫt)t∈N be i.i.d. realizations of a standard
normal distribution. The characteristic shape of the market that arises from this model is depicted
in Figure 3. The solid lines denote a sample path of M(t), the dashed lines a sample path of the
estimates Mˆλ(t) and MˆN (t).
Figure 3: Sample path of M(t) and Mˆ(t) in the Bass-model
For each λ ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.15, . . . , 0.90} we run 1000 simulations of the policy Φλ, and for all
N ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . . , 25}, we run 1000 simulations of ΦN .
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Results:
The solid lines in Figure 4 show the simulation-average of AverageRegret at t = 500 for both Φλ
and ΦN , at different values of λ. The dashed lines show the upper bounds 2K0(σ
2 1−λ
1+λ + c
(I)(λ))
for Φλ, and 2K0(σ
2/N + c(II)(N)) for ΦN , where c
(I)(λ) and c(II)(N) are as in Section 3.3.2,
σ2 = 1, K0 = 1/4, and d = 0.27 (this was the largest observed value of |M(t + 1) −M(t)| over
all t and all simulations. Of course, this quantity is in practice not observed by the seller, and a
larger value of d just shifts the dashed lines upward in the figure).
Figure 4: AverageRegret(Φλ, 500) and AverageRegret(ΦN , 500) for the Bass model
The optimal value of λ according to our upper bound equals λ = 0.45, with a corresponding upper
bound on the regret of 0.31. The simulation average of AverageRegret(Φ0.45, 500) was equal to
0.27. The optimal value of λ according to the simulations, was λ = 0.60, with a simulation average
of AverageRegret(Φ0.60, 500) equal to 0.26.
The optimal value of N according to our upper bound equals N = 3, with a corresponding upper
bound on the regret of 0.32. The simulation average of AverageRegret(Φ3, 500) was equal to 0.27.
The optimal value of N according to the simulations, was N = 4, with a simulation average of
AverageRegret(Φ4, 500) equal to 0.26.
Comparison to other methods:
Figure 3 shows that the range of values that the market process attains can be quite large. A
robust optimization approach would give very conservative prices, and would lead to an average
regret that is substantially larger than what is achieved by our pricing method. Neglecting the
variability of M(t) in the estimation step (by taking λ = 1 or N = ∞) is detrimental as well,
as illustrated by Figure 4. Thus, in this scenario, taking into account the changing nature of the
market process improves the performance of the firm significantly.
4.2 Pricing in the Presence of Price-Changing Competitors
Suppose the firm is acting in an environment where several competing companies are selling
substitute products on the market. The firm knows that the competitors occasionally update
their selling prices, but is not aware of the moments at which these changes occur.
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In particular, consider the following case. The firm assumes that in each period, the probability
that the market process changes because of the behavior of competitors, is not more than ǫ. If a
change occurs, the maximum jump is assumed to be not more than d.
Set-up:
We choose gt(p) = g(p) = −p for all t ∈ N, pl = 1 and ph = 50, and let ǫ = 0.02, d = 5. At each
period t a realization zt of a uniformly distributed random variable on [0, 1] is drawn. If zt ≥ 0.02
then M(t) = M(t− 1); otherwise, M(t) is drawn uniformly from the interval [30, 35]. Let (ǫt)t∈N
be i.i.d. realizations of a standard normal distribution. (Note that these differ from the constant
ǫ determined by the firm).
For each λ ∈ {0.10, 0.15, 0.20, . . . , 0.95} we run 1000 simulations of the policy Φλ, and for all
N ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . . , 25}, we run 1000 simulations of ΦN .
Results:
The characteristic the shape of the market that arises from this model, is depicted in Figure 5.
The solid lines denote a sample path of M(t), the dashed lines a sample path of the estimates
Mˆλ(t) and MˆN (t).
Figure 5: Sample path of M(t) and Mˆ(t) in the model with price-changing competitors.
The solid lines in Figure 6 show the simulation average of AverageRegret at t = 500 for both Φλ
and ΦN , at different values of λ. The dashed lines show the upper bounds K0(σ
2 1−λ
1+λ +c
(I)(λ)) for
Φλ, and K0(σ
2/N + c(II)(N)) for ΦN , where c
(I)(λ) and c(II)(N) are as in Section 3.3.3, σ2 = 1,
K0 = 1/4, ǫ = 0.02, and d = 5. Note that (ǫt)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are here independent, and thus
by Remark 6, the factor 2 in the righthandsides of (14) and (15) is not present.
The optimal value of λ according to our upper bound equals λ = 0.50, with a corresponding upper
bound on the regret of 0.25. The simulation average of AverageRegret(Φ0.50, 500) was equal to
0.11. The optimal value of λ according to the simulations, was λ = 0.75, with a simulation average
of AverageRegret(Φ0.75, 500) equal to 0.08.
The optimal value of N according to our upper bound equals N = 3, with a corresponding upper
bound on the regret of 0.28. The simulation average of AverageRegret(Φ3, 500) was equal to 0.12.
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Figure 6: AverageRegret(Φλ, 500) and AverageRegret(ΦN , 500) for experiment 3.
The optimal value of N according to the simulations, was N = 6, with a simulation average of
AverageRegret(Φ6, 500) equal to 0.09.
Comparison to other methods:
Figure 6 illustrates that taking into account all available data (i.e. λ = 1 or N = ∞) would lead
to much larger regret than obtained at the optimal λ and N . Thus, similar to scenario (ii), taking
into account the changing nature of the market process leads to a significant profit improvement.
A robust maximin pricing policy would be to use
arg max
p∈[1,50]
min
M∈[30,35]
p(M − p) = arg max
p∈[1,50]
p(30− p) = 15
throughout the time horizon. This leads to an average regret of 1.1509, more than three times
higher than the average regret of 0.3189 achieved by our method. Even assuming that M(t) is
fixed and equal to 32.5 (and using the corresponding optimal price p = 16.75 throughout the time
horizon) would, in our simulations, lead to an average regret of 1.0745; still more than three times
higher than what is achieved by our method.
5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper we study the problem of dynamic pricing and learning in a changing market envi-
ronment. This is a major departure from the existing literature on dynamic pricing and learning,
in which one practically always assumes that the market is stable. We consider a setting where
the market process is modeled as a stochastic process, whose value is not directly observed by
the firm. We discuss two suitable estimation methods, with a forgetting factor and with a slid-
ing window, and prove bounds on the expected estimation errors. Subsequently we introduce a
methodology that enables the firm to hedge against changes in the market. In particular, we
show how assumptions on the market process, determined in advance by the firm, translate into
upper bounds on the (long run) average regret, and, in addition, how these bounds can be used
to derive the optimal forgetting factor or window size. We show in three concrete scenarios how
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the methodology works, and provide numerical illustrations that show the good performance of
the method in the Bass-market model and in a setting with price-changing competitors.
An important insight from our results is that taking into account the fluctuating nature of the
market can significantly improve the pricing decisions of a firm.
Our results points to several interesting directions for future research. Related to the dynamic
pricing model, an interesting extension would be to assume that both σ2 and gt(p) are unknown,
and have to be learned as well. To begin with, one could assume the parametric form gt(p) =
g(p) = −bp for some b > 0. One step further is to consider the case that σ2 and b themselves are
also varying over time. Even for the bound functions c(I)(λ) and c(II)(N), information about their
behavior might be derived from sales data, by estimating the impact Iλ(t) and IN (t). An ad-hoc
method to do so would be to replace all terms M(i) in the definition of Iλ(t) by their estimate
Mˆi(t), and a similar procedure to estimate IN (t).
Finally, we believe that the methodology developed in this paper might be useful not only for the
considered dynamic pricing problem, but also for other types of problems that involve simultaneous
learning and optimizing in a changing environment. Two examples are stochastic inventory control
problems (Huh and Rusmevichientong, 2009, Huh et al., 2011), or dynamic pricing with finite
inventories (Besbes and Zeevi, 2009, den Boer and Zwart, 2011).
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6 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (7) can be rewritten as
Mˆλ(t)−M(t+ 1) =
∑t
i=1 ǫiλ
t−i∑t
i=1 λ
t−i
+
∑t
i=1(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i∑t
i=1 λ
t−i
.
Note that (
∑t
i=1 λ
t−i)−1 = (1−λt)−1(1−λ)1(λ < 1)+ 1t1(λ = 1) and E [ǫiǫj ] = E [ǫiE [ǫj | Fi]] = 0
whenever i < j. As a result,
E


∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
i=1
ǫiλ
t−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 = t∑
i=1
λ2(t−i)E
[
ǫ2i
] ≤ σ2(1− λ2t
1− λ2 1(λ < 1) + t1(λ = 1)
)
,
and (10) follows using |a+ b|2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2 for all a, b ∈ R, and
(
1− λ2t
1− λ2 1(λ < 1) + t1(λ = 1)
)(
1− λ
1− λt1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
)2
=
1− λ
1 + λ
1 + λt
1− λt1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1).
If (ǫt)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, then E[ǫiM(j)] = 0 for all i, j ∈ N, and (12) follows
from
E
[∣∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
= E


∣∣∣∣∣
∑t
i=1 ǫiλ
t−i∑t
i=1 λ
t−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

+ E


∣∣∣∣∣
∑t
i=1(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i∑t
i=1 λ
t−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2


≤ σ2
∣∣∣∣∣
∑t
i=1 λ
t−i∑t
i=1 λ
t−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ E


∣∣∣∣∣
∑t
i=1(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i∑t
i=1 λ
t−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 ,
with equality if (ǫt)t∈N is homoscedastic.
Similarly, equation (9) can be rewritten as
MˆN (t)−M(t+ 1) = 1
min{N, t}
( t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
ǫi +
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
M(i)−M(t+ 1)
)
.
Equation (11) follows using |a+ b|2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2 for all a, b ∈ R, and by noting
E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
ǫi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

 = 1
min{N, t}2
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
E
[
ǫ2i
] ≤ σ2/min{N, t}.
If (ǫt)t∈N and (M(t))t∈N are independent, then E[ǫiM(j)] = 0 for all i, j ∈ N, and (13) follows
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from
E
[∣∣∣MˆN (t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
= E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
ǫi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

+ E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
M(i)−M(t+ 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2


≤ σ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
M(i)−M(t+ 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

 ,
with equality if (ǫt)t∈N is homoscedastic.
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the theorem in two steps. In step 1, we show that there exists a K0 > 0 such that for
all M ∈M, M ′ ∈ R and for all t ∈ N,
rt(p
∗
t (M),M)− rt(p∗t (M ′),M) ≤ K0(M −M ′)2. (24)
In step 2 we apply this result with M = M(t), M ′ = Mˆλ(t) or M
′ = MˆN (t), to obtain the regret
bounds.
Step 1. Fix an attainable value M ∈ M of the market process, fix t ∈ N, and let r′t(p,M) and
r′′t (p,M) denote the first and second derivative of rt(p,M) w.r.t. p. Let M
′ ∈ R.
Case 1: p∗t (M) = p
#
t (M). Then by assumption r
′
t(p
∗
t (M),M) = 0, and a Taylor series expansion
yields
rt(p,M) = rt(p
∗
t (M),M) +
1
2
r′′t (p˜,M)(p− p∗t (M))2,
for some p˜ on the line segment between p and p∗t (M). Let
Kt = sup
p∈[pl,ph]
|r′′t (p,M)| = sup
p∈[pl,ph]
|2g′t(p) + g′′t (p)|,
and note that Kt is independent of M , and finite, because of the continuity of g
′′(p). Then
rt(p
∗
t (M),M)− rt(p,M) ≤
Kt
2
(p− p∗t (M))2 for all p ∈ [pl, ph]. (25)
Write ht(p) = −gt(p) − pg′t(p), and note that r′t(p,M) = M − ht(p). By assumption, for each
M ∈ M there is a unique p#t (M) such that ht(p) = M , i.e. p#t (M) = h−1t (M) is well-defined.
In addition, for all M ∈ ht([pl, ph]) = {ht(p) | p ∈ [pl, ph]}, we have ∂∂M p#t (M) = (h−1t )′(M) =
1/h′t(h
−1
t (M)) = −1/r′′t (p∗t (M),M) > 0. Thus, p#t (M) is continuous, differentiable, and monotone
increasing on M ∈ ht([pl, ph]). These properties imply the following: if there is an M ∈ M s.t.
p#t (M) > ph, then there is an Mh(t) s.t. h
−1
t (M) > ph whenever M > Mh(t), h
−1
t (Mh(t)) = ph,
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and h−1t (M) < ph whenever M < Mh(t). Similarly, if there is an M ∈ M s.t. p#t (M) < pl,
then there is an Ml(t) < Mh(t) s.t. h
−1
t (M) > pl whenever M > Ml(t), h
−1
t (Ml(t)) = pl, and
h−1t (M) < pl whenever M < Ml(t).
If p∗t (M
′) = p#t (M
′), then a Taylor expansion yields
|p∗t (M ′)− p∗t (M)| = |h−1t (M ′)− h−1t (M)| ≤ |M ′ −M |Lt,
where Lt = supM∈ht([pl,ph]) |(h−1t )′(M)| = 1/ infM∈ht([pl,ph]) |r′′t (p∗t (M),M)|, which is finite by
assumption.
If p∗t (M
′) < p#t (M
′), then p∗t (M
′) = p#t (Mh(t)) = ph, M
′ > Mh(t), and
|p∗t (M ′)− p∗t (M)| = |p#t (Mh(t))− p#t (M)| ≤ |Mh(t)−M |Lt ≤ |M ′ −M |Lt.
If p∗t (M
′) > p#t (M
′), then p∗t (M
′) = p#t (Ml(t)) = pl, M
′ < Ml(t), and
|p∗t (M ′)− p∗t (M)| = |p#t (Ml(t))− p#t (M)| ≤ |Ml(t)−M |Lt ≤ |M ′ −M |Lt.
It follows that |p∗t (M ′)− p∗t (M)| ≤ Lt|M ′ −M |, and thus by (25) we have
rt(p
∗
t (M),M)− rt(p∗t (M ′),M) ≤
1
2
KtL
2
t (M
′ −M)2, (26)
for all M ′ and all M ∈ ht([pl, ph]).
Case 2: p∗t (M) 6= p#t (M). Then M /∈ [Ml(t),Mh(t)]. Suppose M > Mh(t), the case M < Ml(t)
is treated likewise. If M ′ > Mh(t) then rt(p
∗
t (M),M) − rt(p∗t (M ′),M) = 0, suppose therefore
M ′ ≤Mh(t). We have
rt(p
∗
t (M),M)− rt(p∗t (M ′),M) = rt(p∗t (Mh(t)),M)− rt(p∗t (M ′),M)
=p∗t (Mh(t))[M + gt(p
∗
t (Mh(t)))]− p∗t (M ′)[M + gt(p∗t (M ′))]
=rt(p
∗
t (Mh(t)),Mh(t))− rt(p∗t (M ′),Mh(t)) + (p∗t (Mh(t))− p∗t (M ′))(M −Mh(t))
≤1
2
KtL
2
t (M
′ −Mh(t))2 + Lt(Mh(t)−M ′)(M −Mh(t))
≤
(
1
2
KtL
2
t +
1
4
Lt
)
(M ′ −M)2,
where in the last inequality we use the fact xy ≤ 14 (x + y)2, x, y ∈ R, with x = Mh(t) −M ′,
y =M −Mh(t).
This completes the proof of (24), with K0 = supt∈N
1
2KtL
2
t +
1
4Lt.
Step 2.
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By Proposition 1, we obtain
AverageRegret(Φλ, T )
=
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E
[
rt(p
∗
t (M(t+ 1)),M(t+ 1))− rt(p∗t (Mˆλ(t)),M(t+ 1))
]
≤ K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E
[∣∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
≤ 2K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
[
σ2
[
(1− λ)
(1 + λ)
(1 + λt)
(1− λt)1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
]
+ Iλ(t)
]
.
Since
T−1∑
t=1
λt
1− λt =
λ
1− λ +
T−1∑
t=2
λt
1− λt ≤
λ
1− λ +
∫ T−2
t=1
λt
1− λt dt
≤ λ
1− λ +
−1
log(λ)
∫ λ
x=0
1
1− xdx =
λ
1− λ +
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
,
we have for λ < 1,
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
(1− λ)
(1 + λ)
(1 + λt)
(1− λt) =
1− λ
1 + λ
+
2
T − 1
1− λ
1 + λ
T−1∑
t=1
λt
1− λt
≤ 1− λ
1 + λ
+
1
T − 1
(
2λ
1 + λ
+ 2
1− λ
1 + λ
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
)
, (27)
and thus
AverageRegret(Φλ, T )
≤2K0σ2
[
1− λ
1 + λ
+
1
T − 1
(
2λ
1 + λ
+ 2
1− λ
1 + λ
log(1− λ)
log(λ)
)]
1(λ < 1)
+2K0σ
2
[
1 + log(T − 1)
T − 1
]
1(λ = 1)
+
2K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
Iλ(t).
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In addition, we have
AverageRegret(ΦN , T )
=
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E
[
rt(p
∗
t (M(t+ 1)),M(t+ 1))− rt(p∗t (MˆN (t)),M(t+ 1))
]
≤ K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E
[∣∣∣MˆN (t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
≤ 2K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
[
σ2
min{N, t} + IN (t)
]
≤2K0σ2
[
log(min{T − 1, N})
T − 1 +
1
min{N,T − 1}
]
+
2K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
IN (t),
where we used
T−1∑
t=1
1
min{N, t} =
N∑
t=1
1
t
+
T−1∑
t=N+1
1
N
≤ 1 + log(N) + T − 1−N
N
if T − 1 ≥ N,
T−1∑
t=1
1
min{N, t} =
T−1∑
t=1
1
t
≤ 1 + log(T − 1) if T − 1 < N,
and thus
T−1∑
t=1
1
min{N, t} ≤ log(min{T − 1, N}) +
T − 1
min{N,T − 1} .
Proof of Proposition 2
The condition M(t) ∈ [2bpl, 2bph] a.s., for all t ∈ N, implies p∗(M) = M/(2b) for all attainable
values of M , and r(p∗(M),M)− r(p∗(M ′),M)) = (M −M ′)2/(4b) for all attainable values of M
and M ′. By Proposition 1 we obtain
LongRunAverageRegret(Φλ)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E
[
r(p∗(M(t+ 1)),M(t+ 1))− r(p∗(Mˆλ(t)),M(t+ 1))
]
= lim sup
T→∞
K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E
[∣∣∣Mˆλ(t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
= lim sup
T→∞
K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
[
σ2
[
(1− λ)
(1 + λ)
(1 + λt)
(1− λt)1(λ < 1) +
1
t
1(λ = 1)
]
+ Iλ(t)
]
=K0
[
σ2
(1− λ)
(1 + λ)
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Iλ(t)
]
,
26
and
LongRunAverageRegret(ΦN )
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E
[
r(p∗(M(t+ 1)),M(t+ 1))− r(p∗(MˆN (t)),M(t+ 1))
]
= lim sup
T→∞
K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E
[∣∣∣MˆN (t)−M(t+ 1)∣∣∣2
]
= lim sup
T→∞
K0
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
[
σ2
min{N, t} + IN (t)]
=K0
[
σ2
1
N
+ lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
IN (t)
]
.
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The assumption supt∈NM(t) − inft∈NM(t) ≤ d implies lim supT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 Iλ(t) ≤ d2 and
lim supT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 IN (t) ≤ d2. Together with Theorem 1 this proves the proposition.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 4
We show that the assumption |M(t) −M(t + 1)| ≤ d a.s., for some d ≥ 0 and all t ∈ N, implies
lim supT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 Iλ(t) ≤ d2(1 − λ)−2 and lim supT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 IN (t) ≤ 14d2(N + 1)2, for any
λ ∈ [0, 1) and N ∈ N≥2. Together with Theorem 1 this proves the proposition.
Let λ ∈ [0, 1). Then
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t−1
Iλ(t) =
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E


∣∣∣∣∣ 1− λ1− λt
t∑
i=1
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2


≤ 1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
(1− λ)2
(1− λt)2
∣∣∣∣∣
t+1∑
i=1
d(t+ 1− i)λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
(1− λ)−2
(1− λt)2 d
2
∣∣−(t+ 1)(1− λ)λt + (1− λt+1)∣∣2
=
1
T − 1(1− λ)
−2d2
T−1∑
t=1
(
1− tλt 1− λ
1− λt
)2
,
from which it follows that
lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t−1
Iλ(t) ≤ d2(1− λ)−2.
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Let N ∈ N≥2, then
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
IN (t)
=
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2


≤ 1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
d(t+ 1− i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d
min{N, t}
min{N,t}∑
j=1
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
1
4
d2(min{N, t}+ 1)2
=
d2
4
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
(N + 1)2 +
d2
4
1
T − 1
min{T−1,N−1}∑
t=1
[(t+ 1)2 − (N + 1)2]
=
d2
4
(N + 1)2 +
d2
4
1
T − 1
[
−min{T − 1, N − 1}(N + 1)2 +
min{T,N}∑
t=2
t2
]
=
d2
4
(N + 1)2 +
d2
4
1
T − 1 ·[
(1−min{T,N})(N + 1)2 − 1 + min{T,N}(min{T,N}+ 1)(2min{T,N}+ 1)/6
]
,
where we used
∑N
t=1 t
2 = N(N + 1)(2N + 1)/6. After some algebraic manipulations, we derive
that 1T−1
∑T−1
t=1 IN (t) can be upper bounded by
{
1
4d
2−1+T (T+1)(2T+1)/6
T−1 if T < N
1
4d
2
[
(N + 1)2 + 1T−1N(−4N2 − 3N + 7)/6
]
if T ≥ N .
Taking lim supT→∞, we obtain
lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
IN (t) ≤ 1
4
d2(N + 1)2.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 5
We show that the assumptions P (M(t+ 1) 6=M(t)) ≤ ǫ for all t ∈ N and some ǫ ≥ 0, and
supt∈NM(t) − inft∈NM(t) ≤ d for some d > 0, imply lim supT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 Iλ(t) ≤ d2ǫ 1(1−λ2) and
lim supT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 IN (t) ≤ d2ǫ (N+1)(2N+1)6N , for any λ ∈ [0, 1) and N ∈ N≥2. Together with
Theorem 1 this proves the proposition.
For t ∈ N, define
X(t) = min{k ∈ {1, . . . , t+ 1} |M(k) =M(k + 1) = . . . =M(t+ 1)},
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and note that P (X(t) = k) ≤ P (M(k − 1) 6=M(k)) ≤ ǫ. for all k = 2, . . . , t+ 1.
For λ ∈ [0, 1), we have
E


∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
i=1
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2


=
t+1∑
k=1
E


∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
i=1
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
| X(t) = k

P (X(t) = k)
≤
t+1∑
k=2
E


∣∣∣∣∣
k−1∑
i=1
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
| X(t) = k

 ǫ
≤
t+1∑
k=2
d2
∣∣∣∣∣
k−1∑
i=1
λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2
ǫ
=d2ǫ(1− λ)−2[(1− λ2)−1(1− λ2t)− 2λt(1− λ)−1(1− λt) + tλ2t],
and thus
lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t−1
Iλ(t)
= lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
E


∣∣∣∣∣ 1− λ1− λt
t∑
i=1
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))λt−i
∣∣∣∣∣
2


≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
1
(1− λt)2 d
2ǫ[(1− λ2)−1(1− λ2t)− 2λt(1− λ)−1(1− λt) + tλ2t]
=d2ǫ(1− λ2)−1.
Let N ∈ N≥2, then
IN (t) = E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2


=
t+1∑
k=1
E


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
t∑
i=1+(t−N)+
(M(i)−M(t+ 1))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
| X(t) = k

P (X(t) = k)
≤
t+1∑
k=2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
min{N, t}
k−1∑
i=1+(t−N)+
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
ǫ = d2ǫ
t∑
k=1+(t−N)+
(
k − (t−N)+
min{N, t}
)2
= d2ǫ
(min{N, t}+ 1)(2min{N, t}+ 1)
6min{N, t} ,
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and thus
lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
IN (t)
≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
d2ǫ
(min{N, t}+ 1)(2min{N, t}+ 1)
6min{N, t}
=d2ǫ
(N + 1)(2N + 1)
6N
.
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